A atuação da Africom em combate ao terrorismo na África: o caso Al-Shabaab na Somália

Abstract

This paper aims to analyze Africom's role in combating terrorism in Africa. The impasse is oriented towards understanding the results and consequences obtained by Africom through its actions in combating terrorists. The central question is defined in the following questions: Does Africom as an American command favor or prevent the extremist rise? And is Africom able to mitigate the rise of terrorists in Africa? The argument is based on the fact that there is an individualist action by the USA in Africa, with little international coalition, which can contribute to the extremist aggravation. Furthermore, it is argued that Africom has not been able to reduce the number of incidents caused by such groups. The command aspects of the war on terror demonstrate actions aimed at exercises, training, cooperation and support in operations in much of Africa, including Somalia. To reach the conclusions, the chosen methodology is the historical empirical qualitative, applied through bibliographical review, statistical data and singular case study. The investigation about the role of the command in Somalia in combating Al-shabaab leads the case study. Statistical data provided for the resolution that Al-Shabaab had significant growth and incidents. Based on the research, it is understood that there has been an increase in incidents caused by terrorist groups in Somalia, which corroborates the lack of cooperation between the United States through Africom and international actors to combat terrorists. It is also identified that Africom faces challenges to contain extremist groups in Africa as a whole.